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ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: JONES V. FLUOR
DANIEL SERVICES AND MISSISSIPPI'S STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Reed Nunnelee*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that a couple hired a babysitter for a romantic night out.
Before leaving, Mom gave strict instructions to Junior about what he could
eat that night (within earshot of the babysitter, of course). Surveying the
kitchen countertops, Mom pointed out the forbidden foods: "Now Junior,
you are not allowed to eat the chocolate chip cookies, cherry pie, strawberry cake, peach cobbler, or banana pudding." Mom clarified, "Anything
else, though, you are free to eat."' As soon as the couple drove away,
Junior climbed up on the countertop and pulled down a plate of brownies
that had been in plain view. Just as he was about to shovel a brownie in his
mouth, the babysitter intervened: "Whoa Junior! I don't think so! Didn't
you hear what your Mom said about all those sweets? You put that plate of
brownies back right now!" Junior's response was predictable: "Oh, come
on! She didn't say anything about brownies! And besides, she also said

that I could eat anything she didn't list!" Sensing that Mom probably intended to keep Junior's sweet-tooth unsatisfied (as it turns out, Mom had
banned all of the other sweets), the babysitter snatched the plate away:
"Yes, but these brownies are just as sugary as those other things, and your

mom wouldn't want you eating these either!"
The babysitter's dilemma is similar to the one taken up by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Jones v. Fluor Daniel Services.2 In Jones, the plaintiffs brought claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but the
defendant argued that the claims were time-barred by Mississippi Code
section 15-1-35-a statute of limitations that provides a one-year period of
limitations for certain intentional torts.3 Curiously, the statute does not
include intentional infliction of emotional distress.4 Like Junior, the plaintiffs pointed out that their claim could not be found in section 15-1-35 and,
* To my wife, Kemily: thank you for being patient with me. I love you, and I owe you a date
night. And to Professors Modak-Truran, Jackson, Christy, and Aden: thank you for your insight. No
date night, though.
1. Cf Genesis 2:16-17.
2. Jones v. Fluor Daniel Servs. Corp. (Jones II), 32 So. 3d 417 (Miss. 2010).
3. Miss. CoDE Arm. § 15-1-35 (1972).
4. Id
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furthermore, that section 15-1-49 provides a three-year period of limitations for "[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed." Like the babysitter, though, the court held that intentional
infliction of emotional distress is "of like kind or classification" with the
listed torts and is therefore governed by section 15-1-35.6
This Note will primarily focus on whether the court interpreted section
15-1-35 correctly. Any discussion of statutory interpretation requires an
evaluation of the policies that support the legislation, and this Note will
examine the policies that underlie section 15-1-35. This Note will also speculate as to why intentional infliction of emotional distress is absent from
section 15-1-35, and it will call for a legislative amendment to add it. It will
also take a chronological look at previous cases where the court ruled on
the appropriate period of limitations for claims that are absent from section
15-1-35, and it will analyze Jones in light of that precedent. Finally, this
Note will address whether a judicial fix was the right solution in this case,
or if the court overstepped its judicial function by operating in the lawmaking realm of the legislature.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The six plaintiffs in this case, all black males, were employed by Fluor
Daniel Services Corporation ("Fluor Daniel") and worked under the direct
supervision of Rudy Amaro.' The plaintiffs claimed that Amaro, who is of
Mexican descent, committed many racially-motivated offenses during the
scope and course of his employment and that Fluor Daniel was thereby
vicariously liable for Amaro's actions.8 Generally, the plaintiffs contended
that Mexican workers were shown favoritism and that black employees
were treated unfairly because of their race.9 All of the plaintiffs were terminated from their employment with Fluor Daniel between October 27,
2001 and February 22, 2002,10 and the plaintiffs alleged that they were discharged for reporting the illegal activities of Fluor Daniel to other
supervisors."
The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Jasper County
on April 4, 2003, alleging, among other things, intentional infliction of emotional distress.1 2 On March 22, 2005, the circuit court granted Fluor
Daniel's motion for summary judgment and entered a final judgment with

5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (1972).
Jones II,32 So. 3d at 425.
Jones v. Fluor Daniel Servs. Corp. (Jones 1),959 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Miss. 2007).
Id. at 1045-46.
Id. at 1046.
Jones II,32 So. 3d at 419.
Jones 1,959 So. 2d at 1046.
Id.at 1046, 1048.
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prejudice that same day.1 The plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Mississippi Supreme Court on April 9, 2005.14 The court found that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court reversed as
to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, affirmed as to all
other issues, and remanded."
On remand, Fluor Daniel again moved for summary judgment, this
time alleging that intentional infliction of emotional distress was timebarred by Mississippi Code section 15-1-35 (which provides a one-year period of limitations for certain intentional torts).1 6 The plaintiffs contended
that, because intentional infliction of emotional distress is absent from section 15-1-35, that their claims were governed by section 15-1-49 (which provides a three-year period of limitations on all claims for which a period of
limitations has not been established) and, therefore, timely." The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Fluor Daniel, and the plaintiffs again appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court.18
In a 5-4 decision, the court affirmed on all issues.' 9 Specifically, the
court held that, although intentional infliction of emotional distress is not
enumerated in section 15-1-35, it is "of like kind or classification" with the
listed torts and, therefore, carries a one-year limitations period. 0 In so
ruling, the court expressly overruled Norman v. Bucklew in which it had
held that "intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims are governed by the three-year statute of limitations." 21
III.

BACKGROUND AND

HiSTORY

OF THE LAW

Section 15-1-35 provides a one-year statute of limitations for a variety
of intentional torts:
All actions for assault, assault and battery, maiming, false
imprisonment, malicious arrest, or menace, and all actions
for slanderous words concerning the person or title, for failure to employ, and for libels, shall be commenced within
one (1) year next after the cause of such action accrued, and
not after.
By contrast, section 15-1-49 provides that "[a]ll actions for which no other
period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3)
years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after." At first
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 1046.
Id.at 1044, 1046.
Id.at 1044.
Jones II,32 So. 3d 417, 419 (Miss. 2010).
Id at 421-22.
Id.at 419.
Id.at 425.
Id.at 423.
684 So. 2d 1246, 1248 (Miss. 1996).
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blush, the statutes are unambiguous; however, much uncertainty has surrounded which statute applies to intentional torts that are absent from section 15-1-35, since the policies supporting a short period of limitations for
intentional torts seemingly apply to most intentional torts-whether listed
in section 15-1-35 or not. Unfortunately, the Mississippi Supreme Court
has not been consistent in applying the two statutes, especially with regard
to intentional infliction of emotional distress.
A.

The Predecessors to Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress:
How the Mississippi Supreme Court has Construed
Section 15-1-35 Regarding Other Intentional Torts

By its own admission, the Mississippi Supreme Court has been schizophrenic in explaining how section 15-1-35 should be construed. 2 2 While the
court has been consistent in holding that the statute is broader than the
enumerated torts, it has been unpredictable in describing just how expansive the statute is. The earliest indication that the court would extend section 15-1-35 beyond the enumerated torts is found in Bush v. City of Laurel

where the court refused to apply the one-year statute to a claim in trespass,
explaining that trespass was "not of the type enumerated in said Code section." 2 3 Such language suggested that the statute could be construed to
include unenumerated torts, but the court did not elaborate. It was not
until twelve years later, in Dennis v. Travelers Insurance Co., that the court

expounded on Bush.2 4
In Dennis, the plaintiffs sought relief from an insurance company that
had sent letters threatening criminal prosecution to enforce payment of an
alleged debt.2 5 The plaintiffs did not plead the tort of "menace" (because it
would have been time-barred under section 15-1-35) but instead alleged
"threat."2 6 The court held that, because "menace" means "threat," the
claim was time-barred under section 15-1-35.27 It explained that plaintiffs
cannot avoid statutes of limitation by cleverly pleading around them.2 8 The
court described section 15-1-35 as "inclusive" and, although it did not expound, a reasonable interpretation is that section 15-1-35 includes claims
that can be fairly re-labeled as one of the listed torts. 2 9
22. Jones II, 32 So. 3d at 422 ("This Court has been inconsistent in its rulings on whether an
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim is subject to a one-year statute of limitations under
Mississippi Code Section 15-1-35").
23. 105 So. 2d 562, 566 (Miss. 1958) (emphasis added).
24. 234 So. 2d 624, 626 (Miss. 1970).
25. Id. at 625.
26. Id.

27. Id. at 626-27.
28. Id.

29. Id. The full text is reproduced here so that the reader can draw his or her own conclusions
about what the court meant by saying that section 15-1-35 (formerly section 732) is "inclusive":
It is clear that Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated section 732 (1956), which provides an inclusive listing of the recognized intentional torts is controlling in the case at bar. There can be no
escape from the bar of the statute of limitations applicable to intentional torts by the mere
refusal to style the cause brought in a recognized statutory category and thereby circumvent
prohibition of the statute. Furthermore, the letter, which is the basis for the action at bar, falls
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The issue arose again fifteen years later in Southern Land & Resources
Co. v. Dobbs where the court ruled that a claim for wrongful foreclosure
fell under the catchall section 15-1-49 (then a six-year limitation) and not
the one-year statute in section 15-1-35.30 The court first explained that legislative history supported a one-year limitation on the listed intentional
torts and a longer period of limitations on actions "upon the case."31 Because wrongful foreclosure is a case action, the court said, it was governed
by section 15-1-49.32 As further (though much shakier) support, it explained that when the Dennis court held section 15-1-35 to be "inclusive"
that it meant "all-inclusive."3 Consequently, the court reasoned that
wrongful foreclosure must be governed by section 15-1-49 since it is not in

the 15-1-35 list. 34
Five years later, when the court was asked to decide which statute of
limitations applied to the torts of false arrest and malicious prosecution, the
City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson court misapplied the standards it had
previously laid down in Bush, Dennis, and Southern Land & Resources,

and the opinion appeared to signal a major shift in how it would interpret
section 15-1-35.35 Seeing where the City of Mound Bayou court departed
from precedent is evident in this sentence-by-sentence analysis:
"Our cases suggest the statute's force is not limited to the eight torts labeled

therein."36
That is right. As discussed above, that is precisely what Bush, Dennis,
and Southern Land & Resources suggest.
"Bush v. City of Laurel says the statute includes torts 'of the type enumerated' in the statute."3 7

Also correct, but the Bush court did not expound on what it meant by
"of the type." Two interpretations are reasonable: (1) the Dennis interpretation: a plaintiffs claim that can be re-labeled as one of the torts
listed in the statute is "of the type" enumerated in the statute;38 (2) a
squarely within the purview of the statute under the category of "menace" as set out in the
statute.
Some (including the Southern Land court fifteen years later) conclude that, by "inclusive," the Dennis
court meant "all-inclusive" or "complete" or "closed," but that must be wrong. Surely the Dennis court
knew that trespass and conversion, for example, are intentional torts that are not found in section 15-135, and it would not have suggested that section 15-1-35 is complete. Therefore, the most reasonable
interpretation of "inclusive" is "flexible" or "meant-to-include," and not "closed" or "complete."
30. 467 So. 2d 652, 655 (Miss. 1985).
31. Id. The legislative history referred to here is merely a recollection of previous versions of the
pertinent statutes. Mississippi preserves very little (if any) of the other various forms of legislative
history. See infra Part V.A.2.
32. Id.
33. Id. (emphasis added); see supra note 29.
34. Id. at 655.
35. 562 So. 2d 1212 (Miss. 1990).
36. Id. at 1217.
37. Id. (internal citations omitted).
38. Dennis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d 626, 626 27 (Miss. 1970).
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much broader interpretation: all torts that are similar in nature to
those listed in the statute are governed by it.
"Dennis v. Travelers Insurance Co. is more expansive, holding that the statute 'provides an inclusive listing of the recognized intentional torts.' ""

As indicated in the paragraph above, saying that Dennis is more expansive than Bush is misleading. If anything, Dennis gave a narrow
reading to Bush.
"Southern Land & Resources Co., Inc. v. Dobbs repeats the point."40

Why the court cites Southern Land & Resources here is mysterious.
As noted above, Southern Land & Resources held that section 15-1-35
is an "all-inclusive" list of torts and should be construed as such. 4 1 But
here, the court uses Southern Land & Resources as support for its
holding that section 15-1-35 is not a comprehensive list. The dissent in
Jones v. Fluor Daniel Services Corp. points out that "the Southern

Land & Resources Court held the precise opposite of what the City of
Mound Bayou Court claimed it held." 42
"If this be so, the proscription of the statute necessarily extends beyond the
tort labels specifically appearing,for but a moment's reflection calls to mind
any number of intentional tort actions recognized in Mississippi law which
are not enumerated as such in Section 15-1-35."43

This is the court's wrong, but natural, conclusion. The court was
adopting, for the first time, the second interpretation of the Bush language, and this much broader interpretation is a misreading of

precedent. 44
Under this broad reading of case history, the City of Mound Bayou court
unsurprisingly held that claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution
fell under the authority of section 15-1-35, noting their similarity to other
torts listed in the statute-false imprisonment, malicious arrest, and

menace. 45
Two years later, in Nichols v. Tri-State Brick and Tile Co., Inc., the

court considered whether a claim for malicious interference with business
relations was governed by section 15-1-35.46 The defendants argued that
"the [section 15-1-35] listing is not exclusive and the statute also applies to
non-enumerated torts as well," citing Dennis as support.4 7 However, the
court explained that Dennis meant something much narrower:
39. City of Mound Bayou, 562 So. 2d at 1218 (internal citations omitted).

40. Id. (internal citations omitted).
41. S. Land & Res. Co. v. Dobbs, 467 So. 2d 652, 655 (Miss. 1985). See supra notes 30-34 and

accompanying text.
42. Jones II, 32 So. 3d 417, 427 (Miss. 2010) (Kitchens, J., dissenting).
43. City of Mound Bayou, 562 So. 2d at 1218.
44. See supra text accompanying note 38.
45. City of Mound Bayou, 562 So. 2d at 1218-19.
46. 608 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1992).
47. Id. at 331-32. Why the defendant did not argue that the statute should be construed under
the more liberal rule set out in City of Mound Bayou is unclear.
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[T]he fact that wrongful conduct is alleged to be intentional
does not determine which statute controls. Dennis means
no more than that the absence of a label is, similarly, not
controlling. Where, as there, the conduct alleged may be
fairly categorized as one of the enumerated torts, the oneyear statute applies. Otherwise, it does not. We will not
squeeze all intentional wrongs into the actions

enumerated. 48
Under that rationale, the court concluded that malicious interference could
not be fairly re-labeled as one of the section 15-1-35 torts and, therefore,
fell under the authority of section 15-1-49.49
To summarize, the Mississippi Supreme Court's position on intentional
torts not named in section 15-1-35, although somewhat muddled by City of
Mound Bayou, remained reasonably clear-while the statute was not intended to cover all intentional torts, those that can be fairly re-labeled as
one of the enumerated torts will remain within its scope. That is, plaintiffs
cannot escape the statute's bar by simply renaming their claim (e.g. pleading "threat" instead of "menace"). Although City of Mound Bayou appeared to liberalize this rule, the court reasserted its pre-City of Mound
Bayou position in Nichols, and Nichols appeared to be the standard it
would follow.
B.

The Statute of Limitations Governing Claims for
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Although the Mississippi Supreme Court did not rule on the applicable period of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress until
1996 (four years after Nichols),so the overwhelming majority of Mississippi
appellate courts, as well as federal district courts and the Fifth Circuit, consistently held that intentional infliction of emotional distress was governed
by section 15-1-35.51 But confusion set in when the Mississippi Supreme
Court finally ruled on the issue, holding in Norman v. Bucklew that intentional infliction of emotional distress was governed by the three-year statute of limitations. 52 The holding is particularly problematic because the
court did not cite any authority for its ruling.53
The court heard the matter again in Southern v. Mississippi State Hos-

pital, but it did not resolve the issue of whether section 15-1-35 or section
48. Id. at 333.
49. Id.
50. Norman v. Bucklew, 684 So. 2d 1246 (Miss. 1996).
51. E.g., King v. Otasco, Inc., 861 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1988); Diggs v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., No. 1:OOCV1-D-D, 2001 WL 588856, (N.D. Miss. 2001); Malloy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No.
4:96CV157-EMB, 1997 WL 170313 (N.D. Miss. 1997); Campbell v. Jackson Bus. Forms Co., 841 F.
Supp. 772 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Watkins v. United Parcel Serv., 797 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Brown
v. Dow Chem. Co., 777 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Miss. 1989); Air Comfort Sys. v. Honeywell, Inc., 760 So. 2d
43 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
52. 684 So. 2d 1246 (Miss. 1996).
53. Id. at 1256.
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15-1-49 applied. 54 Because the defendant was a governmental entity, the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act one-year statute of limitations applied, and the
court (properly) analyzed the claim under section 11-46-11 instead.55
Four years later, when the court decided CitiFinancialMortgage Co. v.

Washington, it cited Southern for the rule that intentional infliction of emotional distress was governed by section 15-1-35, although Southern clearly
does not support such a holding.5 6 The confusion is understandable; in discussing the case's history, the Southern court reprinted a portion of the trial
court order of dismissal which stated that "[u]nder Mississippi law, the
plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress also is subject to a one-year statute of limitations under the Mississippi Tort Claims
Act as well as Miss. Code Ann. section 15-1-35."" Although the Southern
court did not affirm the trial court's opinion on this issue (it does not even
discuss it), the Washington court obviously looked at the language in the
opinion and wrongly used it as support for its own holding.
Finally, the issue was raised once more in Pierce v. Cook, but the court
again neglected to cite any binding authority in holding that claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress fall under the scope of section 151-35 (relying instead on one Mississippi Court of Appeals decision).58

IV.

INSTANT CASE

The primary issue presented in Jones was whether claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are governed by section 15-1-35
(which provides a one-year statute of limitations for certain intentional
torts but does not include intentional infliction of emotional distress) or
section 15-1-49 (which provides a three-year statute of limitations for all
claims for which a period of limitations has not been established). 59 The
overwhelming weight of nonbinding authority had held that it is governed
by section 15-1-35 despite its absence from the statutory list. 60 Applying
section 15-1-35 to unenumerated claims is not new to the Mississippi Supreme Court; it had done so on multiple occasions for various other
claims. 6 ' However, this case is particularly problematic in light of Norman
v. Bucklew-a Mississippi Supreme Court decision holding that intentional
54. 853 So. 2d 1212 (Miss. 2003).
55. Id.

56. CitiFinancial Mortg. Co. v. Washington, 967 So. 2d 16, 19 (Miss. 2007).
57. Southern v. Miss. State Hosp., 853 So. 2d at 1214.

58. 992 So. 2d 612, 618 (Miss. 2008) (citing Slaydon v. Hansford, 830 So. 2d 686, 689 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2002)).
59. Jones II,
32 So. 3d 417, 421-23 (Miss. 2010).
60. E.g., King v. Otasco, Inc., 861 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1988); Diggs v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., No. 1:OOCV1-D-D, 2001 WL 588856, (N.D. Miss. 2001); Malloy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No.
4:96CV157-EMB, 1997 'WL 170313 (N.D. Miss. 1997); Campbell v. Jackson Bus. Forms Co., 841 F.
Supp. 772 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Watkins v. United Parcel Serv., 797 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Brown
v. Dow Chem. Co., 777 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Miss. 1989); Air Comfort Sys. v. Honeywell, Inc., 760 So. 2d
43 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
61. See infra Part IIA.
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infliction of emotional distress is governed by a three-year period of limitations.6 2 In Jones, the five-vote majority expressly overruled Norman and
held that intentional infliction of emotional distress claims fall under a oneyear statute of limitations, explaining that they are "of like kind or classification" with the intentional torts listed in section 15-1-35 and should be
categorized with them.6 3 Joined by three others in dissent, Justice Dickinson argued that statutes of limitations should be strictly construed and
would favor upholding the three-year limitation laid down by Norman."'
A.

Majority Opinion

At the outset, the court recognized that it had been inconsistent in its
handling of the statute of limitations issue, and it juxtaposed Norman
(holding that intentional infliction falls under a three-year statute) with
other cases applying section 15-1-35 as the appropriate statute.65 The court
further recognized that at least two of the cases applying section 15-1-35
were misguided-Pierce cited no binding authority, and Southern analyzed
the issue under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act statute and not under section 15-1-35.66

The court noted that Dennis "opened the door for ambiguity" when it
held that section 15-1-35 applied to a claim for "threat," despite the absence of "threat" from the section 15-1-35 list.67 The majority explained
that after Dennis was decided, the court consistently recognized that statutes which specifically enumerate items under their control should be "construed as excluding from [their] effect all those not expressly mentioned or
under a general clause, those not of like kind or classification as those enu-

merated." 68 Seizing on the "not of like kind or classification" language, the
court held that intentional infliction of emotional distress is similar enough
to those intentional torts listed in section 15-1-35 to be included among
them.6 9
In so ruling, the court expressly overruled Norman.o It noted that the
Norman decision did not cite any authority in support of its holding that
intentional infliction claims fall under the three-year statute. 1 In distinguishing Norman, the court borrowed analysis from a federal decision; it
62. 684 So. 2d 1246 (Miss. 1996).
63. Jones II, 32 So. 3d at 423 (citing Pierce v. Cook, 992 So.2d 612, 618 (Miss. 2008); CitiFinancial
Mortgage Co. v. Washington, 967 So.2d 16, 19 (Miss. 2007)).
64. Id. at 425-28.
65. Id. at 422.
66. Id.
67. Id. As noted in Part III.A., though, the "door for ambiguity" was opened twelve years earlier
in Bush.
68. Id. (quoting S.W. Drug Cor. v. Howard Bros. Pharmacy of Jackson, Inc., 320 So. 2d 776, 779
(Miss. 1975) (emphasis in original).
69. Id. at 423.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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explained that Norman failed to distinguish between negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and did not cite precedent. 7 2 Further,
the court held that if Norman had purposefully set out to define the applicable statute of limitations, it would not have addressed this issue "in so
cavalier a manner, with nothing more than an oblique reference, unaccompanied by explanation."
B.

Dissenting Opinion

The dissenters would construe section 15-1-35 more narrowly, and
they argued that the statute should be interpreted as an exhaustive list. 74
The dissent argued that "[w]hen a statute is plain and unambiguous ... it is
not within the province of this court to add to the law as the Legislature has
written it."75 In support of its position, the dissent cited authority holding
that "[w]e will not squeeze all intentional wrongs into the actions enumerated ,"76 and it referenced several cases that excluded an intentional tort
from the section 15-1-35 list.7 7 Obviously, the dissent pointed out the Norman decision, and it saw no reason to overrule it.78
The dissent also questioned the majority's use of case authority. Like
the majority, it noted that at least two cases supporting a one-year statute
were not applicable, and it suggested that the majority misinterpreted the
authority that it had relied upon in the present case. 7 9 Further, it criticized
the majority's use of nonbinding federal authority and pointed out that
there is, in fact, federal authority holding that a three-year period of limitations applies to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.o

V.
A.

ANALYSIS

Discerning the Legislative Intent Supporting Section 15-1-35
Is the First Step in Analyzing the Jones Case.

Mississippi courts have consistently held that legislative intent must

remain the cornerstone of statutory construction.81 That is, most Mississippi courts, whether explicitly or not, have followed the maxim that

72. Id. (citing Hervey v. MetLife Gen. Ins. Corp. Sys. Agency of Miss., 154 F. Supp. 2d 909, 915

(S.D. Miss. 2001).
73. Id. (quoting Hervey, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 917).
74. Id. at 425-28.
75. Id. at 428 (quoting City of Hazlehurst v. Mayes, 51 So. 890, 891 (Miss. 1910)).
76. Id. at 426 (quoting Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile Co., 608 So. 2d 324, 333 (Miss. 1992)).
77. Id.at 426-28.
78. Id.at 426.
79. Id.at 426-27.
80. Id.(citing Hubbard v. Miss. Conference of United Methodist Church, 138 F.Supp.2d 780
(S.D. Miss. 2001).
81. JEFFREY

JACKSON & MARY MILLER,

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MISSISSIPPI LAW

§ 68:50 (2010)

("The vast majority of Mississippi precedents state that the primary consideration for statutory analysis
is legislative intent."). The term "construction" is often misunderstood (understandably so) in this context to mean that something is being "built," but that is not the case. This sort of "construction" is
derived from the word "construe" and simply means "interpretation," and the terms are often used
interchangeably.
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in construing statutes this Court will not only interpret the
words used, but will consider the purpose and policy which
the legislature had in view of enacting the law. The court
will then give effect to the intent of the legislature. 8 2
So, in the instant case, unearthing the legislative intent that supports
section 15-1-35 is the first task. It is, of course, only after doing so that one
can properly evaluate the result in Jones.
1. Statutes of Limitation (in General) Keep Stale Claims Out of Courts
and Protect Defendants from Litigating Ancient Claims.
There is a broad consensus in American jurisprudence that statutes of
limitation are a mechanism for keeping stale claims out of courts.83 The
primary policy supporting statutes of limitation is upholding defendants'
reasonable expectations against litigating ancient claims when "evidence
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." 84
Another factor, of course, is judicial economy; statutes of limitation free up
valuable court time by barring tenuous claims so that courts have time to
hear more meritorious cases.8 " The Mississippi Supreme Court is no different regarding how it views the purpose of statutes of limitation:
The primary purpose of statutory time limitations is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time .

. .

. They are designed to suppress assertion of false

and stale claims, when evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, witnesses are unavailable, or facts are incapable
of production because of the lapse of time. 86
Statutes of limitation do not operate perfectly, though. They are arbitrary, prophylactic rules, and like most arbitrary rules, statutes of limitation
occasionally have unintended consequences. For example, while one claim
may become stale in a matter of weeks, and another may be ripe for several
years, both may be governed by the same statute of limitations. One point
of a prophylactic rule, though, is to have a rule. Sometimes rules are unreasonable, but the rule prevents courts from using up valuable court time
82. Tunica Cnty. v. Hampton Co. Nat'l Sec. 27 So. 3d 1128, 1133 (Miss. 2009).
83. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 14 (2010) ("The primary purpose of a statute of
limitations is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing
party has a fair opportunity to defend; that is, to prevent undue delay in bringing suit on claims or to
encourage promptness and diligence in bringing actions.").
84. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 125 (2002) (quoting R.R. Teles. v. Ry.
Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
85. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 17 (2010) ("Statutes of limitation are intended, in
part, to avoid burdening courts with stale claims and promote judicial economy."); Developments in the
Law Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950) ("Another factor may be an estimate
of the effectiveness of the courts, and a desire to relieve them of the burden of adjudicating inconsequential or tenuous claims.").
86. Stockstill v. State, 854 So. 2d 1017, 1024 (Miss. 2003) (quoting Cole v. State, 608 So. 2d 1313,
1317 (Miss. 1992)).
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figuring out, on an ad hoc basis, whether a specific claim is stale or not.
The statute of limitations provides that certain types of claims will be stale
after a period of time without considering whether the actual claim is provable. In some cases, a stale claim will be treated as timely (even though the
evidence to prove it may be lost) while a ripe claim filed one day late will
be treated as untimely. Prophylactic rules draw definite but arbitrary lines
under the presumption that, in most cases, the line drawn will be drawn
fairly. 87
2.

Discerning Legislative Intent Behind Section 15-1-35 (Specifically)
Requires an Application of the Tools of Construction.
Generally, categories of claims become stale at different times, and if a
single statute of limitations governed all actions it would be unrealistic and
unreasonable. As a result, the Mississippi legislature has enacted more
than one hundred statutes of limitation to govern different types of
claims," but understanding why the legislature establishes unique periods
of limitation on various causes of action (i.e. discerning legislative intent)
remains the essence for interpreting and applying them. Section 15-1-35
provides a one-year period of limitations for nine intentional torts, but intentional infliction of emotional distress is not among them. What is
unique about these specific torts that prompted the legislature to single
them out? Is it significant that all of the enumerated torts are intentional
torts against the person?8 9 Why are some intentional torts not listed?
Unfortunately, these questions are not easily answered, and arriving at
legislative intent is often more art than science-especially in Mississippi.
Determining legislative purpose is both simplified and complicated by the
fact that very little exists in Mississippi's legislative record concerning
lawmakers' subjective intent. There are no records of legislative debates,
no committee reports, or any other documents that might explain legislative motive. 90 As Judge Southwick notes, "[t]he annual journals of each
house do not contain such information but instead record official actionsattendance, votes, language of offered bills and amendments, and other
matters that reflect the procedure and not the substance of the legislature's
consideration."91
Without these aides, all that is left to assist in interpreting legislative
intent is the text of the statute itself. Indeed, the Mississippi Supreme
Court has indicated that "[w]hatever the legislature says in the text of the
87. My thanks to Professor Jeffrey Jackson for his insights on this topic.
88. JEFFREY JACKSON & MARY MILLER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Mississippi LAw § 44:24 (2010)
("The practitioner is advised that in addition to the 38 limitations of Title 15, at least 85 specific limitations are contained elsewhere in Mississippi's Code.").
89. A footnote in Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile Co. concedes that claims for "slander of title"
may, arguably, be an exception; however, the phrase "is commonly employed to describe words or
conduct which bring or tend to bring in question the right or title of another to particular property, as
distinguished from the disparagement of the property itself." 608 So. 2d 324, 332 n.8 (Miss. 1992) (quoting Walley v. Hunt, 54 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1951)).
90.

JEFFREY JACKSON

91. Id.

& MARY MILLER,

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

MISSISSIPPI

LAW

§ 68:53

(2010).
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statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent" 92 and has
even held that legislative intent must be gleaned "from the legislative acts
alone."93 But inferring legislative intent from the statute itself is understandably difficult. Therefore, a collection of interpretive norms has developed to assist courts with this task; among them are the various "canons of
construction," as well as an assortment of other tools to aid in interpretation.94 Even with the assistance of these tools of construction, however,
legislative intent sometimes remains an aspiration.
And so the first goal of this Note is apparent: to determine, as closely
as possible, what the legislature intended when it enacted section 15-1-35.
As made clear by previous discussion, this can only be done through the
use of the various tools of construction, and it is to these tools that we now
turn.
Interlude One: Plain Meaning Theory

Before going any further, it should be acknowledged that an argument
exists (which Justice Dickinson makes in his dissent) that section 15-1-35 is
clear and unambiguous on its face and, therefore, is capable of standing
alone and without the aid of tools of construction.9 5 This model of statutory interpretation has become widely-known as the "plain meaning theory," and the Mississippi Supreme Court has articulated it as follows:
[T]he first question a court should decide is whether the
statute is ambiguous. If it is not ambiguous, the court
should simply apply the statute according to its plain meaning and should not use principles of statutory construction.96
Of course, this mode of interpretation only begs the question: How does a
judge know if a statute is, in fact, ambiguous? One commentator recognizes that "[w]hat is sufficient to make a statute ambiguous is itself somewhat ambiguous."" This concern alone should give courts some pause in
applying the theory, but more importantly, strict adherence to the plain
meaning theory is capable of frustrating the Mississippi Supreme Court's
commitment to discerning legislative intent. If discerning and applying legislative intent is indeed the goal, it should be inconsequential that a statute
is clear on its face; courts should still strive toward arriving at legislative
intent, regardless of the statute's apparent clarity. Indeed, the Mississippi
92. Gregory ex rel Gregory v. Cent. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 953 So. 2d 233, 240 (Miss. 2007).
93. Miss. Gaming Comm'n v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 751 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Miss. 1999)
(emphasis added).
94. E.g., Tunica Cnty. v. Hampton Co. Nat'l Sec., 27 So. 3d 1128, 1133 (Miss. 2009) ("When
statutes are ambiguous and potentially in conflict.. . courts look to the rules of statutory construction
for guidance.").
95. Justice Dickinson writes in dissent that "[wihat is plain and unambiguous from a reading of
section 15-1-35 is that intentional infliction of emotional distress is simply not included." Jones II, 32
So. 3d 417, 428 (Miss. 2010).
96. Miss. State Univ. v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 992 So. 2d 595, 606 (Miss.
2008) (internal citations omitted).
97. JEFFREY JACKSON & MARY MILLER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MISSISSIPPI LAw § 68:52 (2010).
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Supreme Court has held that "[w]hether the statute is ambiguous, or not,
the ultimate goal of this court in interpreting a statute is to discern and give
effect to the legislative intent."98
Onto the Tools of Statutory Construction

The tools of construction are not designed to be mandatory rules, but
persuasive factors. Judge Southwick recognizes that "[a]lmost all are described as being merely aids to interpretation and are not necessarily controlling over other evidence of the proper interpretation." 99 In fact, the
tools sometimes yield different, if not opposite, results, but this should be
of little concern. The tools should be used as a tutor, not a tyrant, and the
end-goal should be-it must be-to reach the most reasonable interpretation of the legislature's intent.
In this case, there are several tools that can aid in deriving legislative
intent regarding section 15-1-35. They include: (a) the presumption of
completeness; (b) a legislative intent to let courts complete the statute; (c)
in par materia; (d) expression unius est exclusio alteri; and (e) contextual

reading.
a.

The Presumption of Completeness

"A statute is interpreted starting with the premise that it fully expresses whatever the legislature intended to accomplish." 00 The Mississippi Supreme Court has said it this way:
[P]resumptions are indulged against .... [T]his Court cannot omit or add to the plain meaning of the statute or presume that the legislature failed to state something other
than what was plainly stated.101
Under this premise, then, claims should not be grafted into a statute like
section 15-1-35 that provides an enumerated list of torts which it governs.
Instead, the presumption is that the statute is a complete whole, and that it
was intended to operate on those enumerated torts alone. Therefore, this
canon of construction would place intentional infliction of emotional distress under section 15-1-49.
b.

Legislative Intent to Let Courts Complete Statute

But the presumption of completeness may occasionally yield harsh and
unreasonable results. Therefore, there are instances in which the presumption is one of incompleteness. This presumption arises out of the fact that
legislation is, necessarily, a result of compromise. That is, if one group of
98. In re D.S., 943 So. 2d 1280, 1287 (Miss. 2006) (quoting City of Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So. 2d
1087, 1089 (Miss. 1992)).
99. JEFFREY JACKSON &eMARY MILLER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MISSISSIPPI LAw § 68:59 (2010).
100. Id. §68:63.
101. City of Houston v. Tri-Lakes Ltd., 681 So. 2d 104, 106 (Miss. 1996) (internal citations
omitted).
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legislators prefers "X," and the other "Y," the final version of the statute
might contain neither. The idea, of course, is that an incomplete statute
may serve better than no statute at all, and the legislators contemplate that
the judiciary will fill in the gaps. For example, consider claims brought

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983102 in which Congress created the right to sue, but it
did not establish a period of limitations. Instead, it left to courts the power
to establish those periods of limitation. 10 3
So, in this case, it is arguable that the legislature could not agree on
which statute should govern claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, so it simply chose to ignore it in hopes that the courts would fill in
the gap. This seems unlikely, though. If all of the other intentional torts
against the person can be found in section 15-1-35, it seems unlikely that
the legislature would be divided on this particular tort. There are no good
policy reasons for imposing a longer period of limitations on intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and adding it to the statute would likely be
uncontroversial.
c.

In Pari Materia

"The doctrine of in pari materiaprovides that if a statute is ambiguous,
then the court must resolve the ambiguity by applying the statute consistently with other statutes dealing with the same or similar subject matter."' 0 4 Therefore, section 15-1-35 must be read in light of section 15-1-49,
and this canon of construction would probably place intentional infliction
of emotional distress under section 15-1-49. Section 15-1-49 provides that
"[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be
commenced within three (3) years."' 05
d.

Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alteri

Translated, this canon of construction declares that the "expression of
one thing indicates exclusion of the other." The Mississippi Supreme Court
has explained that "where a statute enumerates and specifies the subject of
things upon which it is to operate, it is to be construed as excluding from its
effect all those not expressly mentioned or under a general clause, those
not of like kind or classification as those enumerated." 0 6
Looking at the words alone, and applying the expressio unius est exclusio alteri rule, the legislature likely intended to include only those enumerated torts, and not to include those that are not listed. Probably, this
canon would say, if the legislature had intended to include a wider array of
torts, it would have (a) listed those torts that it wanted to include; or (b)
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
103. Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, What Statute of Limitations is Applicable to Civil Rights Action
Brought Under 42 U.S.CA. s#1983, 45 A.L.R. FED. 548 (1979).
104. State ex rel. Hood v. Madison Cnty. ex ret Madison Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 873 So. 2d 85,
90 (Miss. 2004).
105. Miss. CODE ANNm.
§ 15-1-49 (1972) (emphasis added).
106. S.W. Drug Corn. v. Howard Bros. Pharmacy of Jackson, Inc., 320 So. 2d 776, 779 (Miss. 1975).
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included a general clause (e.g. "and all other intentional torts against the
person"). It did neither, and the most reasonable explanation under this
canon of construction is that the legislature did not intend to make the
statute any broader than the listed torts.
e.

Contextual Reading

Most (probably all) of the tools point to a strict construction of section
15-1-35-that the enumerated torts are the only torts that the legislature
intended to cover, and, therefore, intentional infliction of emotional distress must fall under the purview of section 15-1-49. But to stop the analysis here would overlook what is perhaps the most obvious characteristic of
the statute-all of the torts listed are intentional torts against the person.1 07
Further, the statute enumerates all of the intentional torts against the person that are recognized in Mississippi (other than intentional infliction of
emotional distress, of course). A natural inference is that the legislature
intended to capture all intentional torts against the person with this statute
but, because intentional infliction of emotional distress is a newcomer to
Mississippi tort law (not recognized in Mississippi until 1963),108 it has
never been grafted into the archaic statute which has "remained unchanged
since its enactment in the Revised Code of Mississippi Chapter LVII, Sec.
II, Art. 7 (1857)."109 Consider Judge Southwick's concurring opinion in
Slaydon v. Hansford:

Except for the phrase "assault and" being added before
"battery" and "for failure to employ" being inserted, this
precise statute has been in existence since 1871. Miss. Code
§ 2152 (1871). Thus the failure to mention certain presently
recognized torts by name in an 130 year old statute has not
been found controlling. Instead, we are to ask if the somewhat archaic words contain the precursor to the relevant
tort known as something else today.1 10
3.

The Bottom Line: The Legislature Probably Intended for Section 151-35 to Operate on All Intentional Torts Against the Person.

There is clearly more than some dissonance in the way section 15-1-35
is worded (suggesting, almost undoubtedly, that the statute is an exclusive
list) and the policy that supports it (all intentional torts against the person
107. A footnote in Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile Co. concedes that claims for "slander of title"
may, arguably, be an exception; however, the phrase "is commonly employed to describe words or
conduct which bring or tend to bring in question the right or title of another to particular property, as
distinguished from the disparagement of the property itself." 608 So. 2d 324, 332 n.8 (Miss. 1992) (quoting Walley v. Hunt, 54 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1951)).
108. Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 150 So. 2d 154 (Miss. 1963).
109. S. Land & Res. Co. v. Dobbs, 467 So. 2d 652, 655 (Miss. 1985).
110. 830 So. 2d 686, 691 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
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should be subject to a one-year period of limitations). So what, then, is the
legislative intent behind section 15-1-35?
When the legislature adopted this statute in 1871, it seems almost certain that it intended to bring all intentional torts against the person under
the one-year period of limitations. Because intentional infliction of emotional distress was not a recognized tort in 1871, however, it was obviously
not considered for inclusion. Likely due to legislative oversight, the statute
has not been amended to add intentional infliction of emotional distress,
but the policies that support a short period of limitations for intentional
torts against the person have not changed. Therefore, to extend these policy considerations to intentional infliction of emotional distress is
reasonable.
First, intentional torts likely have a short period of limitations because,
very often, victims of intentional torts know that they have been injured.
In negligence cases, plaintiffs must occasionally "discover" their injury
before bringing suit, but that is rarely an issue with intentional injury cases.
It is good policy to encourage plaintiffs to sue as closely as possible to the
date of their injury, and a short period of limitations for intentional torts
makes good sense in light of this "discovery" factor.
Another policy consideration is the deterioration of evidence. Obviously, a distinguishing characteristic of intentional torts is that they carry
the element of intent. A tool that is often used to establish the intent element is witness testimony involving subjective evaluation of the defendant.
However, subjective evaluation is extremely vulnerable to deterioration
the further removed the litigation is from the date of the underlying events.
Contrast intentional torts with negligence claims, however, where the evidence relating to the elements of the claim is based primarily on objective
facts that do not depend much on subjective evaluation.
Finally, as a society, it may be that we want prompt resolution of
claims arising from intentional conduct. We want intentional wrongdoers
brought to justice more quickly than negligent ones, perhaps based on the
fear that intentional tortfeasors are more likely to harm again.111
B.

Assuming that the Legislature Intended to Include All Intentional
Torts Against the Person in Section 15-1-35, but It Neglected to
Include Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
Which Branch of Government Should Add It?

If the judiciary's job is to uphold legislative intent, and the legislature
intended to limit all intentional torts against the person to a one-year statute of limitations, it follows that the Mississippi Supreme Court came to the
right result in Jones. But even though the result may be correct, the
method might be criticized, since "adding" claims to a statute is arguably an
overextension of judicial power. However, the Jones court appears to have
111. My thanks to Professor Jeffrey Jackson and Professor Mark Modak-Truran tor their expertise
on these policy considerations. .
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sidestepped this problem by using an alternative approach that reaches the
same result, yet bypasses separation of powers problems.
1. Do Courts Have the Power to "Add" to a Statute Even if Doing So
Would Uphold Legislative Intent?
If the legislature almost certainly intended one thing, but the statute's
wording suggests otherwise, then what is the appropriate remedy? Some
would say that courts cannot intervene to fix what appears to be a legislative oversight-that doing so usurps the legislative function ("judicial activism") with the only proper fix being a statutory amendment. Others would
argue, though, that courts should not be so constrained and would propose
that courts be allowed to uphold their reading of legislative intent in these
circumstances.
Position1: In this case, one camp might contend that intentional infliction of emotional distress claims should probably be subject to the same
one-year limitation as other intentional torts but that the court cannot impose this rule-that it requires a legislative fix. That is, the only way to
hold intentional infliction of emotional distress to the one-year statute
would be for the legislature to (a) put it in the section 15-1-35 list or (b) add
a "general clause" to section 15-1-35 (e.g. "and all other intentional torts
against the person"). They would argue that, although it's unfortunate that
a particular claim should be barred by a one-year statute, the court cannot
steal the legislature's unique lawmaking power by reading into the statute
what it thinks should be there. Those that take this position find support in
the rule laid down by the Mississippi Supreme Court that "[c]ourts have
neither the authority to write into the statute something which the legislators did not write therein, nor to engraft upon it any exception not included
by them."112
Position 2: Others would contend that Position 1 draws the roles between legislatures and courts too exclusively. Statutes are occasionally
poorly-drafted, and it is the courts' job to uphold the legislature's intent
(and to limit the harsh and sometimes unintended consequences of legislation). Getting the legislature to turn its attention to fine-tuning statutes is
often difficult and, as a result, society has given courts some degree of discretion in interpreting statutes. So, here, the mere fact that a tort is not
enumerated in section 15-1-35 is inconsequential if the legislature intended
to put a one-year period of limitations on all intentional torts against the
person.
If Position 2 is taken, however, the court still collides with the rule it
laid down regarding statutory interpretation: "[W]here a statute enumerates and specifies the subject or things upon which it is to operate, it is to
be construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned
or under a general clause, those not of like kind or classification as those
112. Balouch v. State, 938 So. 2d 253, 260 (Miss. 2006).
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enumerated." 1 3 In Jones, the court could have limited the rule, or qualified it, but it did neither; instead, it effectively ignored it.
Interlude Two: A (Very) Brief Response to a Normative Question"Who Should Establish Periods of Limitation?"1 1 4

One of the points that Professor Jeffrey Jackson makes in his article on
statutory construction is that statutes of limitation represent a political
compromise between the interests of plaintiffs (who seek redress), defendants (who seek repose), and the court system (which has an interest in using its resources only for provable claims)." 5 The political compromise is
often unstated, however, because in most cases individuals do not know
whether they will be the defendant or the plaintiff in future litigation.' 16
Because the compromise is political, then, the sense is that periods of limitation should be established legislatively, since that branch of government
has some expertise in balancing political interests.'"
However, courts also have some know-how in establishing periods of
limitations (as the 42 U.S.C. 1983 example in Part V.A.2.b demonstrates).
Also, the equitable doctrine of laches is determined through ad hoc judicial
decision-making. All of this is merely to point out that while legislatures
probably should make these political decisions on limitations (because they
are political compromises), courts have been making these decisions for
centuries and are accustomed to determining when a claim is or is not
timely on an ad hoc basis. As noted above, however, the very nature of
statutes of limitations is to promote judicial economy by discouraging ad
hoc decisions by courts on whether a claim is or is not stale.
2.

An Alternative Approach: Re-labeling

The discussion above outlines the pointed problem that the Mississippi
Supreme Court was confronted with in Jones:
i. When construing a statute, courts should uphold legislative intent.
ii. A particular statute should include X but, likely because of a legislative oversight, it does not.
iii. Some would say that courts are powerless to "graft" X into the
statute (because doing so would amount to improper "judicial
legislation").
How, then, should the courts respond? The Mississippi Supreme
Court has found a creative solution in the statute of limitations context by
re-labeling claims as one of the enumerated torts in section 15-1-35."'s
113. Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile Co., 608 So. 2d 324, 332 (Miss. 1992).
114. My thanks to Professor Jeffrey Jackson for his insight on this subject.
115. Jeffrey Jackson, Legislative Reform of Statutes of Limitations in Mississippi: Proposed Interpretations, Potential Problems, 9 Miss. C. L. REV. 231, 236-38 (1989).

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. For example, see supra Part III.A (describing how the Mississippi Supreme Court re-labeled
"threat" as "menace," and "false arrest and malicious prosecution" as "false imprisonment, malicious
arrest, and menace").
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Federal courts and Mississippi appellate courts have done the same.119 The
Nichols court articulated the approach as follows: "Where, as [in Dennis],
the conduct alleged may be fairly categorized as one of the enumerated
torts, the one-year statute applies. Otherwise, it does not."12 0 By renaming
the pleaded tort, this approach allows the right end (holding the claim to a
one-year statute of limitations) without the overreaching means (judicial
activism). This is often done, as it was in Dennis, when a plaintiff tries to
circumvent the statute of limitations through creative pleading.' 2 ' However, this approach is no less viable when a plaintiff pleads intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that is why many federal courts and
Mississippi appellate courts have held that intentional infliction of emotional distress can be fairly re-labeled as any combination of assault, libel,
menace, and/or slanderous words. 122
3. Synthesizing the Approaches
To summarize, the Jones court was presented with at least four possible avenues by which to treat the intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims:
i. It could have interpreted the statute to include all other similar torts.
That is, it could have taken the position that, while section 15-1-35
does not have a "general clause," it should nonetheless be interpreted
as if it does, because doing so would promote the purpose and policy
supporting the statute and would uphold legislative intent. As mentioned above, taking this approach might draw criticism that the court
was overstepping its judicial function by inappropriately legislating
from the bench.
119. E.g., Suthoff v. Yazoo Cnty. Indus. Dev. Corp., 722 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that
claim for abuse of process was barred by section 15-1-35); Rigby v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 680 F.2d 342,
344 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that a claim for "discharging [the plaintiff] intentionally, wrongfully and
without just cause" was barred by section 15-1-35); Blackwell v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 633 F. Supp.
870, 871 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (holding that while "the statute cannot be avoided by the use of creative
pleading," section 15-1-35 is not applicable to claim for invasion of privacy since "[t]he invasion of
privacy claim is not listed specifically in the statute and cannot, as was done in Dennis, be defined to
'[fall] squarely' within any category included therein"); Andrews v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 443 F. Supp.
510, 513 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (holding that the plaintiffs' claim for intrusion of privacy which caused
severe and emotional stress, anxiety, pain and suffering, embarrassment, insult and revulsion was
barred by section 15-1-35); Childers v. Beaver Dam Plantation, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 331, 333 (N.D. Miss.
1973) (holding that section 15-1-35 applied to an action for malicious prosecution and abuse of criminal
process).
120. Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile Co., 608 So. 2d 324, 333 (Miss. 1992) (emphasis added).
121. The plaintiff in Dennis pled "threat" instead of "menace," but the court held that it was
nonetheless governed by section 15-1-35. Dennis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d 624, 626-27 (Miss.
1970).
122. E.g., Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 211 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that intentional
inifiction of emotional distress is same "type" of tort as menace and was therefore covered by Mississippi's one-year statute of limitations); King v. Otasco, Inc., 861 F.2d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that intentional infliction of emotional distress and outrageous conduct are "so closely analogous to the
common law actions for assault, libel, and slanderous words that they too must fall within the statute's
bar"). Of course, this creative judicial solution could be easily eliminated if the legislature simply
amended section 15-1-35 to include intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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ii. The court could have held that the statute should be not be interpreted to include all other similar torts but that it includes any tort that
can be fairly re-labeled as one in the enumerated list. Operating under
this method, it could have re-labeled intentional infliction of emotional distress as assault, libel, menace, and/or slanderous words.
iii. Same as (ii), except that the court could have held that intentional
infliction of emotional distress cannot be fairly re-labeled as any of the
enumerated torts and instead applied the three-year period of
limitations.
iv. Finally, the court could have adopted the position that the statute
covers only those enumerated torts and does not even include those
that can be re-labeled. This appears to be the dissenters' approach.
4. Which Approaches the Jones Court Adopted
Ultimately, the Jones court adopted both the first and second approaches, although it did neither very convincingly. A sentence-by-sentence analysis will prove helpful:
a.

The Court Begins Its Analysis With a Discussion of the Second
Approach:

"We... find the Fifth Circuit's analysis in King v. Otasco, Inc.... to be
persuasive.12 3 There, the court said, 'although not explicitly listed in the oneyear statute,' the plaintiffs claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and outrageous conduct were 'undoubtedly intentional torts, and so
closely analogous to the common law actions for assault, libel, and slanderous words that they too must fall within the statute's bar.' "124

Unfortunately, this is all of the court's analysis. It does not discuss the
issue that needs the most clarification: how or why intentional infliction of emotional distress can be fairly re-labeled as assault, libel, and
slanderous words. And, if by citing to King, the court was attempting
to adopt any analysis from King, it did not-King is deficient as

well.12 5

123. Jones II, 32 So. 3d 417, 423 (Miss. 2010). Strangely, the dissent criticizes the majority's reliance on "nonbinding federal interpretation," but the majority had little choice. Both the majority and
dissent agree that the Mississippi Supreme Court had never properly analyzed which statute governs
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See supra Part III. Surely the majority felt that it
needed some support for its position.
124. Id. at 423 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
125. King v. Otasco, Inc., 861 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1988). For a good analysis of this issue, though,
see Judge Southwickc's opinion in Slaydon v. Hansford, 830 So. 2d 686, 692 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)
(Southwick, J., concurring) (explaining that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a "modern tort
[and] is a permutation of the protections against personal injury that formerly were covered solely by
what is mentioned in the hoary statute of limitation as 'assault' and 'menace.'").
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Next, the Court Supports Its Holding Under the First Approach:

"Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a tort against the person, as are
the vast majority of those specifically enumerated in section 15-1-35 of the

Mississippi Code." 1 2 6
This is actually too weak. As discussed above, there is a very strong
argument that all of the torts in the section 15-1-35 are intentional
torts against the person. 127
"Therefore, under Nichols, a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is 'fairly embodied' in the causes of action included in
Mississippi Code section 15-1-35."128

This is an understandable reading of the Nichols standard, but it
makes the same error as the City of Mound Bayou court made years
earlier by reading precedent too broadly. 12 9 It is a reasonable mistake,
of course, to think that a tort is "fairly embodied" among others if it is
similar enough to them (in this case, to assume that intentional infliction of emotional distress is "fairly embodied" among the section 15-135 torts because they are all intentional torts against the person), but
that is not what Nichols stands for. Nichols simply reasserted the Dennis rule that plaintiffs cannot escape the statute by pleading around it
(i.e. by re-labeling their claims)-nothing more.
"Based on the prior analysis, we hold that the tort of intentionalinfliction of
emotional distress is of like kind or classification as the torts enumerated in
section 15-1-35, as required by Southwest Drug Company, and it too carries
a one-year statute of limitations."130
The Southwest Drug Company court articulated the expressio unius est
exclusio alteri canon of construction:

[W]here a statute enumerates and specifies the subject of
things upon which it is to operate, it is to be construed as
excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned
or under a general clause, those not of like kind or classification as those enumerated.13 1
Clearly, the majority misread this rule; if it had read it correctly, it
would not have reached this conclusion. It was quick to pounce on the
"of like kind or classification" language, but it neglected to see that the
standard only applies if there is a "general clause." Section 15-1-35, of
course, does not have a general clause. The dissent points out that
"the majority seizes upon the 'of like kind or classification' language
126. Jones II, 32 So. 3d at 423 (internal citations omitted).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
Jones II, 32 So. 3d at 423.
See supra Part 1II.A.
Jones II, 32 So. 3d at 423.
S.W. Drug Corn. v. Howard Bros. Pharmacy of Jackson, Inc., 320 So. 2d 776, 779 (Miss. 1975).
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while ignoring the preceding

'under a general clause' requirement."1 3 2
VI. CONCLUSION
When interpreting a statute, it is the courts' job to uphold the legislature's intent. In this case, the legislature almost certainly intended to create a statute of limitations that would govern all intentional torts against
the person-the policies supporting a short period of limitations for intentional torts against the person are strong, and there is no good reason why
intentional infliction of emotional distress should be treated differently.
Some may question, then, why intentional infliction of emotional distress
cannot be found in the section 15-1-35 list. Although a lack of legislative
history makes a definitive answer difficult, the most reasonable explanation
for its absence is its newcomer status to the field of tort law-it was not
recognized in Mississippi until 19631 3 3-and the legislature probably just
forgot about adding it to a statute almost as old as the state itself.
Still, others may question the integrity of the court's adherence to precedent. Indeed, the court has maintained that "where a statute enumerates
and specifies the subject of things upon which it is to operate, it is to be
construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned or
under a general clause, those not of like kind or classification as those enumerated."' 3 4 And, if this rule is binding law, then the majority decided
Jones wrongly. However, this canon of construction is not binding law but
merely an articulation of a useful tool that can-and should-be weighed
as a factor when interpreting a statute. Blind adherence to any canon of
construction will lead to some very strange results and, as here, sometimes
those canons must be ignored to reach the right result.
Finally, while some may not criticize the result, they might chastise the
court for overstepping its role by "legislating from the bench." That is,
they would argue that while intentional infliction of emotional distress
probably should be barred by a one-year period of limitations, it falls exclusively within the legislature's power to determine which actions are governed by its statutes of limitation, and courts should stay out of this arena.
Perhaps this view draws the roles of legislative and judicial too exclusively-perhaps it does not. But even if it does not, the Mississippi Supreme Court avoided this problem in Jones by the way it characterized a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Essentially, it said
that pleading intentional infliction of emotional distress is simply an alternative way-a modern way-of pleading assault, libel, and/or slanderous
words and, therefore, the court rightly concluded that it is barred by the
statute.

132. Jones II, 32 So. 3d at 427-28.
133. Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 150 So. 2d 154 (Miss. 1963).
134. Nichols v. Tri-State Brick & Tile Co., 608 So. 2d 324, 332 (Miss. 1992).

